

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 05-04-2009		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Reconstruction and Stability Operations: Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Richard C. Hubbard (Chris) Paper Advisor : Professor David Katz				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT The 7 December 2005 National Security Presidential Directive designated the Department of State (DOS) to be the lead agency for coordinating, synchronizing and conducting Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) operations clearly identifies the United States Government interest in transitioning operations to assist the Afghanistan central government in securing its country in order to develop long-term stability and order. For the interim, however, the sole cabinet level organization that possesses the ability to conduct reconstruction and stability operations is the Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD is the only organization manned, staffed, equipped and funded to execute the nation's R&S requirement today. Realizing this reality the DOD has taken steps to broaden its scope through the publication and implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05 direct that stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations be treated as a core military mission and to broaden its planning guidance and training to more fully address post-conflict operations. The DOD serving as the ad hoc lead agency for the interim period is more out of necessity than preference until the DOS and other executive branch organizations expand their manning, equipment and resource capacity to take the lead role. Having the DOD serve in the lead for the interim is not a negative reflection on the contributions being made by other executive branch organizations; their roles are vital to current operations, however, their capacity is limited and must be expanded to effectively take the lead role. DOD is capable of effectively leading R&S operations now while other executive branch organizations build their capacity and capabilities and procedures to take the lead in the future.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Reconstruction and Stability Operations					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT		18. NUMBER OF PAGES 26	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

Reconstruction and Stability Operations; Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way

by

Richard C. (Chris) Hubbard

Major, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

4 May 2009

Contents

Introduction	1
Background	2
Argument – The Department of Defense Approach	5
Counter-Argument – The Department of State Approach	10
Rebuttal	14
Lessons Learned	14
Recommendations	16
Conclusion	17
Notes	18
Bibliography	21

Abstract

Reconstruction and Stability Operations; Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way

The 7 December 2005 National Security Presidential Directive designated the Department of State (DOS) to be the lead agency for coordinating, synchronizing and conducting Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) operations clearly identifies the United States Government interest in transitioning operations to assist the Afghanistan central government in securing its country in order to develop long-term stability and order. For the interim, however, the sole cabinet level organization that possesses the ability to conduct R&S operations is the Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD is the only organization manned, staffed, equipped and funded to execute the nation's reconstruction and stabilization requirements today. Realizing this reality the DOD has taken steps to broaden its scope through the publication and implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05 to direct that stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations be treated as a core military mission and to broaden its planning guidance and training to more fully address post-conflict operations. The DOD serving as the ad hoc lead agency for the interim period is more out of necessity than preference until the DOS and other executive branch organizations expand their manning, equipment and resource capacity to truly take the lead role. Having the DOD serve in the lead for the interim is not a negative reflection on the contributions being made by the executive branch organizations; their roles are vital to current operations, however, their capacity is limited and must be expanded to effectively take the lead role. DOD is capable of effectively leading R&S operations now while the other executive branch organizations build their capacity and capabilities and procedures to take the lead in the future.

Introduction

The Department of Defense (DOD) should be the lead agency for Reconstruction and Stability (R&S) operations under current circumstances. The military is an element of the United States Government's (USG) whole of government approach to the conduct of its foreign relations. The bulk of the personnel, equipment and funding currently needed to conduct R&S operations comes from the DOD. The DOD has implemented policy that formally elevates "stability operations to a core military mission"¹ and has revised its planning guidance and methodology to more broadly address phase four, or post-conflict operations.²

The DOD serving as the lead agency during R&S operations is currently out of necessity and not preference as pointed out by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Ralph Peters during a Foreign Policy Research Institute conference when he stated "the Army and Marine Corps does not want to be in charge on the ground, but that if no one else shows up, then they are the American representatives by default."³ No other executive branch organization is singularly staffed, equipped or funded to lead this effort.

On December 7, 2005 the President, in National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 designated the Department of State (DOS) to serve as the executive agency for planning, synchronization and implementation of all interagency operations for R&S in the 21st Century.⁴ DOS brings language, cultural understanding and diplomacy expertise to the effort, as well as, a corps of foreign service officers who have experience and recognition as the President's representative voice in matters of USG foreign policy that far exceeds that of the DOD. DOS is not staffed, funded or equipped to take the lead role. However, as stated, its expertise and contributions are critically important to the process. DOD is capable of leading the R&S efforts while the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS),⁵ leads

the whole of government efforts to build USG capacity, capabilities and procedures outside of the DOD.⁶

Background

President Obama recently stated that for the United States to achieve its goal of defeating al Qaeda it must “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”⁷ This statement resembles what led President Johnson to restructure the pacification program in Vietnam. Prior to 1967, DOS was the executive agency appointed to coordinate the efforts of all USG civilian agencies in Vietnam.⁸ This effort was loosely managed and most of the operations conducted were done so autonomously rather than in a coordinated and concerted manner that synchronized operations to collectively move toward a common objective.⁹

In May 1967, President Johnson directed that Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) be re-aligned and placed under the control of the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), General Westmoreland and then under General Abrams.¹⁰ President Johnson appointed an ambassador-level civilian Special Assistant and Deputy for Pacification to work within the COMUSMACV staff. This may have been the first time that an ambassador-level civilian was appointed to a position that was senior in position than of the traditional Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) level Political Advisor (POLAD) position within a military command.¹¹

Similar to the program that President Obama laid out for Afghanistan, the CORDS controlled “Accelerated Pacification Program”¹² focused on achieving security at the local and regional levels in order to strengthen and gain legitimacy for the Vietnamese central government.

The outcome of these efforts sought to deny the Viet Cong freedom of movement and safe haven which would systemically disrupt and dismantle its influence and means of control in the villages and hamlets throughout South Vietnam.¹³

The purpose of selecting the Vietnam CORDS model is to draw parallels and to illustrate that lessons learned on the fields of battle and strife in Vietnam may not have been captured and inculcated into both the military and civilian leadership development and training programs as effectively as possible. It also demonstrates that the USG institution may have suffered from what the social scientist Thomas Kuhn referred to as a form of ‘paradigm paralysis,’ or denial that it would ever get bogged down in another quagmire brought on by failures to operationally synchronize and engage the “whole of government”¹⁴ approach to defeat al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in the USG-led global struggle to defeat them.

Commonalities between the Vietnam conflict and the current Long War are numerous, but also different on many planes. However, individual elements may be drawn upon to support the premise of the thesis. First, the CORDS program in Vietnam was implemented while combat operations were being conducted which complicated matters; unlike the R&S operations in both Europe and Japan following World War II that were executed after hostilities ceased. Winning hearts and minds in the cities and countryside of Europe and Japan was difficult, however winning hearts and minds in the countryside of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan while conducting combat operations to defeat an active belligerent requires the ability to provide security while building that nation’s capacity to protect itself; a substantially more difficult and multi-focused task.

Next, building long-term solutions while seeking to make short-term gains such as offering the people an alternative to providing support to, both active and passive, the Viet Cong during the Vietnam conflict and/or the al Qaeda and other insurgent organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a foundational challenge. As in Vietnam, operations to provide security to the people in the villages while engaging the local leaders to gain their trust, confidence and respect are necessary to making progress.¹⁵ Building cohesion that is created by mutual respect is imperative to succeed in the long term and mutually supporting partnerships serve as foundational building blocks to increasing trust through cooperative actions and projects in the short term and beyond.

Collaborative projects such as building roads and schools are enablers for long-term success and, in the short term, successful development may occur by providing training and employment to local residents. This may lead to increased individual wealth which could build greater community wealth potentially presenting local citizens with an alternative choice to fighting with and/or supporting the insurgency. Currently, in Afghanistan, the challenge is getting the people to choose against the insurgency. Some men join the insurgency for money, while others join the insurgency to get revenge against coalition forces because an armed Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike, or poor targeting of bombs may have destroyed their villages and/or killed members of their family.¹⁶ When R&S operations implement procedures to include village, tribal and government leaders as part of the decision-making process then long-term goals may start to gel thus possibly creating a domino effect of legitimizing local, regional and a central government that is functional with little, or no assistance from the USG and/or other coalition partners.

Finally, and tied directly into the previous concept, is that in traditional, small-scale and/or tribal societies one of the best ways to gain the trust, confidence and respect¹⁷ necessary is to “live among the people, our presence is as much a deterrent to the Taliban as it is an enabler of the positive administration of government.”¹⁸ As in the hamlets of Vietnam, without the combined US, NATO and Afghan National Army (ANA) engaging with a persistent presence in the villages of Afghanistan the local population is apt to be suspicious and distrustful of the USG R&S operations and of the Afghan central government. This long-standing suspicion has promulgated into the state of chaos that in Afghanistan has existed for decades in the absence of a central government.¹⁹ This has served to strengthen the cohesion of the regional factions and to magnify the distrust of outside R&S efforts.²⁰ Therefore, perceived activities that may seemingly disrupt, or change the current local hierarchical status quo may be resisted as a means of survival and/or self-preservation.²¹

Argument – The Department of Defense Approach

Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in December 2004 that, “You go to war with the Army you have – not the Army you might want, or wish to have at a later time.”²² This statement parallels the thesis of this paper that the DOD should be the lead agency for R&S operations now. By changing a few words but maintaining the spirit of the statement, one may say that one makes do with the USG interagency capabilities that one has and not the one that is desired, or wished to have at a later time. Building a sustainable civilian-led deployable interagency capability that has the capacity necessary to assume a lead role for R&S operations in Afghanistan is “a good decade away”²³ according to a recent comment made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen.

From a junior enlisted man's perspective I recall during the mid-1980s the Army briefly posited the concept of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), as something that it may be called on to support. But during the Reagan administration the Army's focus was on defeating the Soviet Army that may storm across the Fulda Gap to invade Western Europe. From my perspective, posted in Alaska at that time, the Army was narrowly focused on Soviet Spetsnaz forces conducting sabotage operations and raids to disrupt petroleum operations, or to destroy critical DOD sites in the region.

As I progressed through the ranks I became familiar with the term Stability and Support Operations (SASO), which became a new Army area of interest with the growing mission set that appeared on the rise with humanitarian missions in response to natural disasters both within the U.S and abroad, and with growing multinational operations and security cooperation programs in the Balkans, Central America and Asian nations. Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (JP 3-07)²⁴ and Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations (FM 3-07)²⁵ form the construct for current construct of Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)²⁶ that is at the forefront of current DOD training, planning, coordination, synchronization and operations in the Long War, and in particular, Afghanistan.

DOD published the DOD Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) in November 2005, which serves as a foundational document that is used to ensure it has published implementation and follow-up guidance for military support for SSTR operations.²⁷ DODD 3000.05 provides definitions and guidance that covers the DOD roles and responsibilities as both a lead and supporting agency in the USG whole of government approach to SSTR. DODD 3000.05 defines "Stability Operations"²⁸ as: "military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from

peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”²⁹ The DODD 3000.05 also defines “Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)”³⁰ as: “Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.”³¹ The common element that ties these two DOD directed definitions to the whole of government process is that by definition they direct the military to work within the USG in support of R&S. They both imply, if not state directly, that coordination and synchronization with other USG and non-USG departments, agencies and organizations is encouraged and necessary throughout all activities from peacetime through conflict and into post-conflict transition periods in order to establish and/or maintain a “lasting peace” while “advancing U.S. interests.”³² The remainder of DODD 3000.05 describes and directs how all elements in DOD will adopt and treat SSTR as a “core U.S. military mission … and integrated across all aspects of DOD activities …”³³ will serve as a cooperative role player as directed and necessary in all diplomatic, information and economic roles within the Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic model (DIME).

Operations in Afghanistan have been underway for over seven years. The USG is still struggling to develop an effective whole of government program. With 55,000 US forces³⁴ either currently on the ground in Afghanistan, or scheduled to deploy soon, DOD has deployed there, as well as, in Iraq, Djibouti, the Philippines, and numerous other locations around the world.

One example out of the many programs that has received a lot of press visibility in both Iraq and Afghanistan is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRTs employ military and civilians from the USG interagency working together and in coordination with other government

agencies (OGA) and non-governmental organizations (NGO) directly and indirectly. Out of a total of twenty-six Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) currently operating in Afghanistan twelve are led and commanded by U.S. military officers. The authorized military manning for the twelve PRTs in Afghanistan is 1021 military personnel.³⁵ The authorized civilian agency manning from the DOS, U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is thirty-five civilian personnel with twenty-seven civilians on-hand and serving as of March 2009.³⁶ The civilian agency manning shortfalls are from USAID and the USDA.³⁷ USG civilian agencies are currently charged to fill only three percent of PRT positions and have only been able to fill those positions with seventy-seven percent manning. Comparing military and civilian roles and manning requirements in R&S operations is similar to comparing apples with oranges given that the manning required to perform the directed military missions in Afghanistan is far greater than that required to perform the missions designated to be conducted civilians. However, these manning shortfalls are reflective of the larger issue that the USG capacity does not currently exist to provide the critical capabilities that USAID and the USDA provide to the effort.

Initially following 11 September 2001, the DOD had a limited population of special operations forces (SOF) that possessed the training in cultural and regional awareness, and languages to effectively engage the people of Afghanistan.³⁸ Part of the learning curve for US-led and NATO Forces is that in order to effect change it takes unity of effort among the USG, Afghanistan central government, NATO and non-NATO coalition partners and allies, NGOs and international organizations (IGO). Understanding, appreciating and employing the different capabilities that each one brings to the mission may increase progress and effectiveness, but also may require balancing the burden among heavily tasked organizations and nations and by

addressing redundancy of action to better streamline and synchronize efforts. As security improves, progress is made, and civilian capacities and capabilities increase, the character of R&S operations in Afghanistan should transition from having a heavy military influence and lead to one led by civilian experts in their respective fields in cooperation with the local infrastructure.³⁹

Army LTC Donald Cullison stated that one of the challenges faced by troops and in particular PRTs in Afghanistan was that “In this fight, dollars are bullets.”⁴⁰ The challenge in Afghanistan is magnified by the complexity of the foundational issues created by the presence of Taliban and other insurgent organizations in conflict with ANA, U.S. and NATO forces. The loyalty of the Afghan people, agricultural and natural resources for commerce and freedom of movement in the countryside are at stake. The challenge for the central government of Afghanistan, U.S. and NATO in efforts to increase legitimacy and to gain the trust of the people is to establish security and improve conditions, but “you can’t have security without development and you can’t have development without security.”⁴¹ As was the goal of the CORDS program in Vietnam, the goal of the PRTs and Civil Affairs (CA) personnel in Afghanistan is to “separate the populace from the insurgency” and to have the “people...jump on the side of the Afghanistan government and the coalition.”⁴²

In order to gain the trust, confidence and respect⁴³ of the Afghan people the Afghan government and the coalition forces must work together. One of the initiatives that PRT and CA personnel are employing is to work in cooperation with local government officials, local and religious leaders to determine what projects are needed and to share selection team responsibilities to select what contractors are awarded projects with reduced favoritism and corruption that leads to contractors squandering the money and resources with minimal

productivity and progress.⁴⁴ These efforts serve three-fold. First, they serve to demonstrate “good governance practices”⁴⁵ in order to provide an alternative avenue for local leaders and government officials to build a power base and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their followers honestly, however, the backlash to this approach is that the local leaders may perceive this as an ultimatum rather than as an alternative which may be counter-productive to USG and coalition efforts. Second, by integrating the local leaders into the decision-making process the PRTs are looking to strengthen the bonds of trust and confidence with the local leaders and their followers.⁴⁶ Finally, a goal is to set the conditions to stimulate the local economy by making it a pre-condition to awarding a contract that all contractors must “hire 80 percent of their labor from within the communities in which the project is being worked.”⁴⁷ This contracting requirement seeks to “infuse cash into the local communities making it less tempting for people to accept payments from enemy fighters”⁴⁸ which directly supports the strategic aim to “stop the insurgency.”⁴⁹

Counter-Argument – The Department of State Approach

As noted in the introduction President Bush issued NSPD-44 designating the DOS as the lead agency for “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.”⁵⁰ With that directive the President charged the DOS with: “developing strategies for foreign assistance; to coordinate interagency processes to identify states that are unstable, or at risk; to provide USG policy makers with courses of action, coordinate plans and de-conflict with other cabinet level departments; to build partnerships with NGOs and IGOs, and most importantly lead the effort in building civilian capacities and capabilities in the interagency to respond and/or surge efforts all within the realm R&S.”⁵¹ What NSPD-44 did not do was provide the fiscal resources, personnel, equipment and specialized training into the interagency

process right away in order to facilitate a rapid and well-defined handoff of R&S operations from the primarily DOD-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The argument to support the DOS/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is because the President identified that organization within the DOS as the lead.⁵² The S/CRS is charged with growing the capability to plan, coordinate and synchronize the USG interagency efforts to proactively take action, upon direction from the President, in all actions related to R&S.⁵³ However, there is more to it than that. Once the executive directive is made and the leadership is identified then the work starts and this work requires a lot of time, cooperation, resources and dedicated effort from the whole of the USG, NGOs, IGOs, OGAs, coalition partners and friends to make progress. Initially, the primary tasks of successfully conducting an operation is to determine: who is in charge; what means one has to accomplish the task; the ways one will go about doing things to achieve the desired ends; and how much risk is one willing to take to accomplish the desired ends.

As in CORDS operations in Vietnam, in Afghanistan there are similar challenges in conducting R&S operations in a non-permissive environment. Security is necessary to perform short-term tasks in order to set the conditions for successful long-term engagement and cooperation.⁵⁴ DOS does not have the mission set or the resources to provide physical security for the short-term so it is currently dependent, in Afghanistan, on the DOD to serve in that capacity. However, as DOS-led interagency roles expand, it may choose to contract security as it did in Iraq. This may free up U.S. forces to focus more on its mission of hunting al Qaeda and other terror and insurgent organizations that are a consistent and viable threat throughout the region.⁵⁵

The point is, regardless of what executive-branch department serves as the lead, being successful in Afghanistan requires extensive cooperation. The complexity of these efforts lies in the diversity of the organizations and institutions that make-up these efforts which range from internally within the USG to external efforts with NATO and non-NATO coalition partners, NGOs, IGOs, the Afghanistan government, from President Karzai down to the local leaders, as well as, with other government agencies (OGA), and in accordance with President Obama's new strategy, increased engagement with Pakistan.

In order to energize the process, the President and his national security advisors announced an increase in U.S. forces, as well as, and civilians into Afghanistan.⁵⁶ The number of additional civilians is estimated to be approximately "fifty-one"⁵⁷ additional personnel for PRTs with a total of approximately "300 additional civilian"⁵⁸ positions added in the future.⁵⁹

Additionally, the President appointed "two veteran senior diplomats;"⁶⁰ one will serve as the deputy to the senior United Nations (UN) official in Afghanistan and the other to serve as the deputy ambassador at the embassy in Afghanistan.⁶¹ The President also "nominated Lieutenant General Eikenberry, former U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, as ambassador."⁶²

The President also appointed Richard Holbrooke as the "Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan."⁶³ This leadership team is symbolic of the new strategy that President Obama is implementing to better coordinate and synchronize the whole of government approach regionally.⁶⁴ By increasing security efforts in Afghanistan and with Pakistan the aim is to deny al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist and insurgent organizations from strengthening within the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area and to deny the conduct of cross-border operations, and/or regaining a foothold back inside of Afghanistan.⁶⁵

S/CRS has increased cooperative operations with the Regional Command-East (RC-E) to assess and implement measures that facilitate the focus of PRT and other operations' efforts on long-term objectives.⁶⁶ The planned process for implementation is to "meld military and civilian planning frameworks"⁶⁷ in order to formulate "a 3-5 year end state..."⁶⁸ that guide and collaborate R&S operations in Afghanistan, as well as, to work in cooperation with "USAID ... to institutionalize and standardize the curricula for future Afghan PRT training...Foreign Service PRT training course."⁶⁹ These efforts combined with legislation that "authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transfer to the Department of State up to \$100 million ... to provide assistance in reconstruction, security, or stabilization ..."⁷⁰ known as "1207 funds"⁷¹ may serve to bridge the fiscal resource gap in the future.

One of the challenges that DOS faces leading the USG interagency efforts in R&S operations is the risk of being overwhelmed by the massive "size and resources"⁷² that DOD brings to the effort. U.S. Civil Servant, Michael Miklaucic draws from his experiences while working for the DOS and USAID, and warns that this may lead to, or be perceived as the USG facilitating a "militarization of foreign policy, both internally and globally."⁷³ He also states that in order for DOD to assume a viable supporting role in R&S and other USG-sanctioned non-kinetic operations the military needs to dispose of the "kill people and break things"⁷⁴ mentality and/or image and to build upon and communicate its image of providing assistance as it did during disaster relief operations following the "2004 Asian tsunami."⁷⁵ This idea coincides with the President's strategy for Afghanistan which puts as a priority to increase efforts and to improve the USG strategic communications program.⁷⁶ This program directive targets holding the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan accountable to achieve desired results in order to facilitate continued support by the USG through increased "government accountability"⁷⁷ and

“willingness to cooperate with us to eliminate the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda and other extremist groups.”⁷⁸

Rebuttal

DOD is the only organization manned, staffed, equipped and funded to execute the nation’s reconstruction and stabilization requirements at present. Realizing this reality, the DOD has moved to broaden its scope to encompass R&S operations as a core military mission and broadened its planning guidance to more fully address post-conflict operations.⁷⁹

DOD serving as the lead agency for the interim period is more out of necessity than preference until the DOS and other USG executive branch departments expand their manning, equipment and resource capacity to take the lead role.⁸⁰ Having the DOD serve in the lead for the interim is not a negative reflection on the contributions made by the DOS and other agencies and organizations, NGOs, IGOs and OGAs; their roles are vital to current operations, however, their capacity is limited and must be expanded to effectively take the lead and to fulfill larger supporting roles. DOD is the only executive branch department now capable of effectively leading R&S operations while the DOS and other executive agencies build their capacity, increase their capabilities, and refine their procedures to take the lead in the future.

Lessons Learned

The criticality of capturing lessons learned from past R&S operations such as the pacification programs conducted in Vietnam under CORDS, or more recently the efforts still underway in Iraq and Afghanistan is essential. More importantly, what is done with those lessons in the USG is critical to our national well-being. Injecting lessons learned into future training and experiments is where we discover the key to success in 21st Century engagements

and operations. How the DOD, DOS and other USG agencies and organizations interpret the applicability of lessons learned to their individual operations is important. However, more importantly is how collectively, throughout the whole of government, planning, coordination and synchronization of such applications serves as an enabler to use those lessons to create procedures and techniques to more effectively and efficiently achieve national objectives.

It is often stated in the Army that your foxhole is never done because you can always make improvements to make it more durable for survivability to protect you from enemy fires, or be better camouflaged so your enemy cannot locate your position. The same applies to DOD operations in support of, or in the leading role of R&S.

It is also critical to emphasize that because something worked in Vietnam or Iraq it can also be done in Afghanistan, or someplace else in the future and have the same results. Realizing that every operation, engagement, or action presents unique challenges is critically important.

For example, engagements in the hamlets and villages of Vietnam were conducted differently than in the cities and villages of Iraq and Afghanistan. The people of Vietnam were tied to the land, much like the people of Afghanistan; both are agriculturally based societies, while the people in Iraq are less agriculturally focused and more focused on industry and oil production which is the primary source of employment. The Vietnamese, due to their ties to their rice crops were vulnerable to Viet Cong exploitation for shelter and subsistence while the Iraqis were more vulnerable to insurgents because they offered to pay young unemployed men to join their efforts. Like the Viet Cong, the insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan use coercion and violence to gain support from those who do not offer, or readily support them. Much like the Vietnamese, the Afghans are tied to the land as a means of individual and group security and

survival. The common thread is that in each case the people needed to see that they had, or have alternatives to joining, or supporting insurgencies. Investing in security and progress of their communities to provide an alternative to the insurgents facilitates limited short-term development and creates the potential for vast opportunity in the future for the long-term. Building the level of trust and legitimacy necessary to affect change is the challenge and capturing lessons from the past and present and creatively using them may enhance future performance and successes.

Recommendations

Taking advantage of educational programs that increase language skills, regional and country-specific cultural and religion awareness training, as well as, conducting training and experiments that engage all relevant departments and appropriate levels of the USG will enhance and grow capacity and capability. There are no substitutes for education, training and experience combined with an evaluation system that retains and advances the best people to lead our organizations. These are a few ways to collectively make a long-term investment in our nation. It is imperative that our leaders embrace a paradigm of transformation that is necessary to evolve the whole of government approach from one that is a reactionary, rapid responder to one that is a well-prepared and capable proactive preventer. A measure of caution should be taken, however, as to not create a whole of government program that degrades, or softens into conformity the unique capabilities that individual organizations and agencies contribute. It is our internal cultural and differences that serve as a system of checks and balances that keeps us effective. More importantly it is these differences that make us a diversified and highly successful world leader.

This may be accomplished by conducting more training to increase understanding and to educate members on what the different roles and responsibilities are. This may be achieved through the conduct of war gaming exercises designed to develop standing operating procedures (SOP) and operational plans (OPLAN). Additionally, appropriation of funding is necessary to build USG interagency capacity and to resource the DOS to facilitate its capability to perform the directed responsibilities of the S/CRS.

Conclusion

DOD is currently the on-ground lead for R&S operations in Afghanistan and will be for the foreseeable future. Under the President's new strategy for Afghanistan, security is the main effort in order to facilitate denying al Qaeda and other terrorist and insurgent organizations to remain a viable threat.⁸¹ To implement this strategy the U.S. military is adding approximately 17,000 troops and the civilian USG agencies are adding approximately 300 civilians.⁸²

The long-term strategic goal should continue to build capacity and capability that is prepared to address future challenges while reducing the burden on the DOD so it can focus on the full spectrum of the range of military operations (ROMO).⁸³ It is imperative that DOD retain the lessons learned and knowledge gained in the conduct of counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and focus on core competencies of conventional strategic force capabilities.

Notes

¹ Major Timothy Austin Furin, "Legally Funding Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations." October 2008. Army Law 1. Lexis-Nexis. (27 March 2007).

² Ibid.

³ Michael P. Noonan, "Defense Showstoppers: National Security Challenges for the Obama Administration, A Conference Report," 9 March 2009, NAVMARCOL Library, Newport, RI: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 6 March 2009.

⁴ President, Directive, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2005," National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, (7 December 2005).

⁵ Department of State, Report on Improving Interagency Support for United States 21st Century National Security Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (Washington DC: June 2007), pp. 5-31.

⁶ President, Directive, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2005," National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, (7 December 2005).

⁷ President White Paper, "Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan" (27 March 2009).

⁸ Komer, R.W., reprint for the NWC from Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S. – GVN Performance in Vietnam, R-967-ARPA, August 1972. Published by RAND for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, pp. 113-114.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 113.

¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 114.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 215.

¹⁴ President, Directive, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2005," National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, (7 December 2005).

¹⁵ Thomas R. Seale, "Tribal Engagement in the Anbar Province: The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces," Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 50, 3rd Quarter 2008: pp. 63.

¹⁶ Joe Klein, "The Diplomacy Surge. A trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan reveals how the Obama team hopes to tame the Taliban," Time, 20 April 2009, pp.31.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Dan Green, "Why the Iraq Strategy Isn't the Answer," Armed Forces Journal, November 2008: pp. 19-20.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Donald Rumsfeld quoted by John Amato's Blog Crooks and Liars, Remembering Rumsfeld: "You go to war with the Army you have – not the Army you might want, or wish to have at a later time"

<https://www.johnamatoblogcrooksandliars> (posting used from 14 December 2006).

²³ Admiral Mike Mullen, Mullen Addresses Need for "Whole of Government Approach," (Armed Forces Press Service News Articles), (6 February 2009).

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995).

²⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: October 2008).

²⁶ Department of Defense, DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, (Washington, DC: 2005), pp. 1.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid, pp.2.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Karen DeYoung, "Hundreds of New Civilian Employees Proposed for Afghanistan," Washington Post, 18 March 2009, 3:43 PM (temporary internet files).

³⁵ Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, Brookings Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post 9/11 Afghanistan (9 March 2009), pp. 20.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ LTG Dell L. Dailey and LTC Jeffrey G. Webb, "US Special Operations Command and the War on Terror," Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 40, 1st Quarter 2006: pp. 44-45.

³⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3-16 (Washington, DC: 7 March 2007).

⁴⁰ "Security, Development Intertwine in Afghanistan War," (US Federal News Service, including US State News) ProQuest (Washington, DC: 27 February 2009).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ "Projects Prove Difficult, But Key to Rebuilding Efforts," (FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, Department of Defense) ebSCOhost (Region Group 12: 12 February 2009).

⁴⁵ "Security, Development Intertwine in Afghanistan War," (US Federal News Service, including US State News) (Washington, DC: 27 February 2009).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ "Projects Prove Difficult, But Key to Rebuilding Efforts," (FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, Department of Defense) ebSCOhost (Region Group 12: 12 February 2009).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ President, Directive, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2005," National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, (7 December 2005).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Department of State, Office of the coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Civil-Military Coordination Website Link, (Washington, DC: 21 February 2009).

⁵⁴ "Security, Development Intertwine in Afghanistan War," (US Federal News Service, including US State News) ProQuest (Washington, DC: 27 February 2009).

⁵⁵ LTC Reyes Cole, "The Military Diplomat," Armed Forces Journal, February 2009: pp. 24.

⁵⁶ Karen DeYoung, "Hundreds of New Civilian Employees Proposed for Afghanistan," Washington Post, 18 March 2009, 3:43 PM (temporary internet files).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ President White Paper, "Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan" (27 March 2009).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Afghanistan Website Link, (Washington, DC: 21 February 2009).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Department of State, Office of the coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Civil-Military Coordination Website Link, (Washington, DC: 21 February 2009).

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Michael Miklaucic, "A More Enduring Legacy: Whole of Government Approach to National Security Make Sense," Armed Forces Journal, January 2009: pp. 9.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ President White Paper, "Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan" (27 March 2009).

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Department of Defense, DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, (Washington, DC: 2005), pp. 1.

⁸⁰ Michael P. Noonan, "Defense Showstoppers: National Security Challenges for the Obama Administration, A Conference Report," 9 March 2009, [NAVMARCOL Library](#), Newport, RI: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 6 March 2009.

⁸¹ Karen DeYoung, "Hundreds of New Civilian Employees Proposed for Afghanistan," [Washington Post](#), 18 March 2009, 3:43 PM (temporary internet files).

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, [Joint Operations](#), Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: 17 September 2006 Incorporating Change 1, 13 February 2008), pp. I-8.

Bibliography

Agency Group 09. "Projects Provide Difficult, But Key to Rebuilding Efforts." 12 February 2009. FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database. Forward Operating Base Gardez, Afghanistan: EBSCOhost. [12 February 2009].

Amato, John. "Remembering Rumsfeld: you go to war with the Army you have – not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time." 14 December 2006.

<http://crooksandliars.com/2006/12/15/remebering-rumsfeld-you-go-to-war-with-the-army-you-have-not-the-army-you-might-want-or-wish-to-have-at-a-later-time#comment-13> [24 April 2009].

Furin, Major Timothy Austin. "Legally Funding Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations." Date of publication unknown, 2008 Army Law – 1. Arlington, VA: Lexis Nexis. [27 March 2009].

Campbell, Jason H. and Shapiro, Jeremy. Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post 9/11 Afghanistan. Washington, DC: Brookings, 9 March 2009.

Cole, Lieutenant Colonel Reyes. "The Military Diplomat." Armed Forces Journal. (February 2009): 23-25, 36.

Dailey, Dell L. and Webb, Jeffrey G. Webb. "U.S. Special Operations Command and the War on Terror." Joint Forces Quarterly. (Issue 40, 1st Quarter 2006): 44-47.

DeYoung, Karen. "Hundreds of New Civilian Employees Proposed for Afghanistan." Washington Post, 18 March 2009.
[file:///C:/Users/Owner/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/TemporaryInternetFiles/Content%20\[21\]](file:///C:/Users/Owner/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/TemporaryInternetFiles/Content%20[21]) March 2009].

Green, Dan. "Why the Iraq Strategy Isn't the Answer." Armed Forces Journal. (November 2008): 19-21, 42.

Klein, Joe. "The Diplomacy Surge. A Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan Reveals How the Obama Team Hopes to Tame the Taliban." Time. (20 April 2009): 30-31.

Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam. Santa Monica, CA: Rand , August 1972.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army in Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Miklaucic, Michael. "A More Enduring Legacy." Armed Forces Journal. (January 2009): 8-9, 36-37.

Noonan, Michael P. "Defense Showstoppers: National Security Challenges for the Obama Administration." Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference Report. 6 March 2009. Naval War College Library Distribution/Robert Schnare. Newport, RI: (9 March 2009).

"Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS): Civil-Military Coordination." 21 February 2009.

<http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QJ9> [21 February 2009].

"Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS): Afghanistan." 21 February 2009.

<http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4979> [21 February 2009].

Seale, Thomas R. "Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces." Joint Forces Quarterly. (Issue 50, 3rd Quarter 2008).

"Security and Development Intertwine in Afghanistan War." 27 February 2009. US Federal News Service, Including US State News. Washington, DC: ProQuest. [27 February 2009].

U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army. Army Field Manual for Stability Operations and Support Operations, Field Manual 3-07. Washington, DC: February 2003.

U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Improving Interagency Support for United States 21st Century National Security Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. Washington, DC: June 2007.

U.S. Department of Defense. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. DODD 3000.05. Washington, DC: 28 November 2005.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Operations. Joint Pub 3-0. Washington, DC: 13 February 2008.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Joint Pub 3-07. Washington, DC: 16 June 1995.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. Joint Pub 3-16. Washington, DC: 7 March 2007. 28.

U.S. President. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44. "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization." (7 December 2007).

U.S. President. White Paper. “Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.” <http://www.whitehouse.gov.blog/09/03/27a-new-strategy-for-afghanistan-and-pakistan> [27 March 2009].